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What is a firm? What are the main driving forces that explain the trade-off between make-or 
buy decisions? Since the seminal article of Coase on the nature of the firm (Coase 1937), 
those questions have been put under the attention of a growing number of economists, looking 
for a theory of the firm. Since the beginning of the 70’s many progresses have been made, yet 
despite the important literature on the subject, the make or buy trade-off is still an empirical as 
well as a theoretical challenge. The empirical challenge comes from the difficulty to have a 
complete picture of the phenomenon since firms have a large spectrum of governance 
structures more or less formal, and they move from the hierarchy to outsourcing and from 
outsourcing1 to internalization (Ménard 2004). The theoretical challenge comes from the 
multifaceted phenomenon that can hardly be grasped by a unique theory leading to the 
multiplication of theoretical approaches. Recently some authors such as Foss and Foss (2000) 
or Williamson himself have tried to bring some coherence in all this diversity by considering 
two bodies of literature the governance perspective and the competence perspective2 
(Williamson, 1999).  
In this paper, we confront these approaches by considering one aspect that is common to 
all of them. In fact, albeit their differences, they have in common to give a central role to what 
can be generally called human asset specificity. Human asset specificity refers to specific 
know-how or skills that have been accumulated during the transaction. In this paper, we limit 
our investigation to three theories. Regarding the governance perspective, we will consider 
the transaction cost theory (TCT) (Williamson, 1996). And for the competence perspective, 
we will consider simultaneously the evolutionary theory (Dosi-Marengo, 2000) and the 
resource-based view (RBV) (Barney, 2001); both approaches are knowledge-based 
explanations. They have in common (a) behavioral assumptions (rule-guided behavior and 
learning) and (b) their belief that knowledge and capabilities represent a firm’s critical 
resources.  
Our objective in this paper is to show that the governance and the competence perspectives 
give alternative views of what a firm is and the reasons for internalizing certain transactions. 
Based on a comparison of these alternative explanations, we argue that (i) what distinguishes 
those theories of the firm is mainly (not only) the way human asset specificity is supposed to 
influence the boundary of the firm and (ii) the majority of existing empirical studies are not 
precise enough to rule out competing views. Nevertheless, we show that refinements in 
empirical tests are feasible and already developed that should lead in a near future in a better 
assessment of alternative theories of the firm. 
The article is organized as follow. We first sketch out the TCT’s argument concerning the 
role of human asset specificity to explain make-or-buy decisions before presenting the more 
recent challenging arguments coming from the competence view, that is, the evolutionary 
theory and RBV. Then we come back to empirical evidences to try to rule out competing 
                                                
1 “Such relational form of outsourcing include long term alliances, joint ventures, and other forms of relational 
contracting (e.g. McNeil, 1985)” Mahnke (2001) 
2 it can also be found under the term knowledge-based perspective  
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views, and we specify what type of improvements are needed in order to do so. For this 
discussion, we draw on a few studies that already follow this way. Conclusions follow.  
1. Alternative Theories of the Firm and The Impact of Human Asset 
Specificity 
1.1. The governance perspective -TCT- 
Transaction cost economics views firm as an ultimate (flawed) solution that occurs when 
contractual possibilities are too expensive. In other words, the theory is constructed as if “at 
the beginning there were markets” and looks after conditions in which markets, or contractual 
relationships are not possible.  
Putting it more formally, in its most general form, the decision to choose a governance 
structure (firm vs contracting on the market) represents a standard discrete choice problem. 
Transactors will choose one governance structure if the expected gains (net of transaction 














where GC represents the integration decision, Ga an alternative contractual relationship on 
the market, VC and Va the corresponding values of the transaction under a firm and a 
contractual relationship (V being the transactors’ beliefs about the joint surplus), and G* the 
governance form actually chosen.  
Because the returns transactors expect from governing their transactions in different ways 
are difficult, if not impossible, to observe, a testable theory of governance structures requires 
that the theory relates the benefits and costs of alternative governance arrangements to the 
observable features of the transaction. Thus, to the previous arguments we must add relations 
of the form  
(2) VC = VC(X, ce ) 
and 
(3)  Va = Va(X, ae ) 
where X represents a vector of observable attributes affecting the gains from trading under 




 are error terms that may reflect either 
variables omitted by the investigator or errors or misperceptions on the part of decision-
makers about the true values of cV and aV 4. Let us assume for practical reasons that the 
preceding relations can be represented linearly as 
(2')  VC = βX + ce  
and 
(3')  Va = αX + ae   
                                                
3 See Masten-Meehan-Snyder (1991) and Masten (1986) for more about the way to formalize the integration 
decision. See also Masten 2002 for recent developments. 
4 Potential differences in the set of attributes that affect efficiency under alternative governance arrangements are 
taken into account in the model by the possibility that the estimated marginal effects of particular attributes equal 
zero. 
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We can then represent the probability that a firm emerges over an alternative governance 
form as Pr(G* = GC) = Pr(VC > Va) = Pr( ae - ce <(β-α )X). In other words, an element of X 
whose effect on the expected gains from trade under a firm governance, β, is greater than its 
effect under the alternative arrangement (firm over contracting relationship), α , will increase 
the likelihood that a firm will be the observed form of governance. Theories of contracts 
inform the analysis by identifying which attributes empirical researchers should focus on and 
by predicting the differential effects (i.e., β-α ) of those attributes on the transaction value 
and, potentially, by providing guidance on the functional form of the V(X, e)’s. 
In that respect, based on behavioral assumptions (bounded rationality and opportunism), 
the theory identifies three main factors (uncertainty/complexity of the transaction; frequency 
of the transaction; and asset specificity needed for the transaction) that may increase 
transaction costs (or contractual costs) and that may explain the use of a firm instead of a 
market. 
Asset specificity is central in this theoretical construct. That is especially the case of 
human assets. As noted by Williamson, “Any condition that gives rise to substantial human 
asset specificity – be it learning-by-doing or chronic problems of moving human assets in 
team configurations – favors an employment relation over autonomous contracting. Common 
ownership of successive stages is thus predicted as the degree of human asset specificity 
deepens” (Williamson 1985, page 96). Asset specificity creates bilateral dependency and 
poses added contracting hazards that may give rise to an alternative coordination mechanism: 
the firm. However, the development of human asset specificity may be wanted in order to 
create overall value, by decreasing production costs or / and increasing demand by 
differentiating the product for example. This can be summarized by the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The increase of human asset specificity creates value on the one side and 
increases the level of transaction costs on the other side. This is true inside the firm and 
outside the firm (e.g. on the market). As asset specificity deepens, more complex governance 
structures are required to attenuate costly bargaining over created rent5. 
Hypothesis 2. For each level k of human asset specificity, corresponds a governance 
structure i that is maximizing the value created. If we note Nvik, the net value created with 
this level k of asset specificity using a governance structure i then: 
/i∃ NVik ≤NVjk ji ≠∀  
The firm is then viewed as very distinct from the market as markets and hierarchies have 
different access to fiat (Williamson 1996 vs Alchian & Demsetz 1972) and there is a 
differential in respect with bureaucratic costs. More precisely, the firm is described mainly as 
a coordination mechanism in which there exist low-powered incentives, extensive 
administrative controls and its own dispute settlement machinery (courts will often refuse to 
hear intrafirm disputes, the effect of which is to make the firm its own court of ultimate 
appeal). More recently, considerations of differential probity have been examined 
(Williamson 1999; Bréchemier–Saussier 2000 for an empirical test) in the context of 
transactions where failures of loyalty and real time responsiveness could undermine integrity.  
The main idea is that the firm, with its distinctive capabilities, is able to govern 
transactions of particular kinds for which markets are not suitable, by reducing / controlling 
more strongly opportunistic behaviors and transaction costs that may arise as soon as 
economic actors are in a dependency relationship (Williamson 1996 and Riordan–Williamson 
1985 for a more formal treatment). However, such control is at a cost of high transaction costs 
(e.g. higher transaction costs than on the market with transaction characterized by a lower 
level of asset specificity). 
                                                
5 See Saussier 2000 for an empirical test. 
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Main Proposition concerning the integration decision (TCT): transactions with high level 
of human asset specificity are more probably internalized because the firm handles better such 
transactions compared to the market, even if human asset specificity increases the cost of 
coordination in the firm6. 
More formally, if we focus on transaction costs only7, and we note α tc and βtc the impact of 
X factors on transaction costs respectively on the market and in the firm, it means that asset 
specificity, and more particularly human asset specificity should lead to more integration 
because βtc-α tc<0, with α tc>βtc>0. That is to say transaction costs coming from human asset 
specificity are reduced inside the firm compared to the market because of the distinctive 
capabilities of the firm we mentioned earlier. To illustrate this issue, we propose a quadratic 
form for transaction costs on the market and in the firm (See figure 1). Over a certain 
percentage of human asset specificity, the firm is the more adequate governance structure as it 
permits more value to be created by economizing on transaction costs. 
 
Figure 1. Firms emergence with human asset specificity increasing internal transaction costs 
 
with TCM = x2; TCF = 2000 + 0,5 x + 0,5 x2; x: % of human asset specificity 
TCM: transaction costs on the market ; TCF: transaction costs inside the firm 
The competence perspective departs from transaction cost reasoning in describing the 
mechanisms through which asset specificity influences boundary choices. Knowledge and 
knowledge accumulation is the key issue which challenges the role given by TCT to 
opportunism and asset specificity in the decision to make or buy. 
1.2. The competence perspective – Evolutionary theory and RBV 
Although distinct approaches, the evolutionary theory and RBV are knowledge-based 
explanations of the firm. They have in common (a) behavioral assumptions (learning and rule-
guided behavior8) and (b) their belief that knowledge and capabilities represent the firm’s 
                                                
6 Such proposition could be refined in respect with other parameters like uncertainty/complexity of the 
transaction and frequency of the transaction. 
7 We move from a discussion over total surplus to a discussion over transaction cost levels. Implicitly, we do not 
take into account possible production costs differences moving from markets to the firm. Transaction cost 
economics makes the assumption that production costs are always lower on the market compared to the firm and 
that only transaction cost considerations may explain the emergence of a firm.  
8 Organizational actions and behaviors are based on rules and routines that have emerged through a path-
dependent process of learning and adaptation (Levitt and March, 1988).  
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critical and distinctive resources. Whereas TCT is based on an “implicit ceteris paribus 
assumption that organizations naturally possess, in its optimal form, the knowledge required 
to carry out (…) complex tasks” (Dosi-Marengo, 2000, page 82), the competence perspective 
advocates that firms have to build specific knowledge to be able to “conduct complicated 
procedures to carry out complicated tasks such as producing aircraft, shoes, transportation 
services for people and goods, etc.” (ibid, 2000, page 82). This raises the following question: 
what is the difference between the market and the firm when it comes to build knowledge?  
If we believe in the assumption of bounded rationality, we cannot suppose that the firm’s 
behavior results from an optimization program9. One alternative is that actions are based on 
routines and capabilities that represent where the firm’s distinguishing competences reside. 
What makes the firm better suited to develop knowledge is based on three arguments. First, 
knowledge is the result of learning and experience. Second, since it is the result of learning, it 
is context- (local) and path-dependent (historical). Finally, it is partly tacit and the 
organization is partly unaware of its existence because it is embedded in organizational 
routines and individual skills (Nelson-Winter, 1982, Cohen et al., 1996). For this reason, 
knowledge can only be transferred to a third party who has some absorptive capacity, that is, 
who has already accumulated the required knowledge to understand and integrate the 
knowledge developed by this third party. If it had not this absorptive capacity, the transfer 
would be too costly to be implemented10. Then, why should a firm buy knowledge on a 
market when it has the capacity to build it internally?  
One answer is “there is no reason”. Knowledge is not developed in a vacuum, it is build as 
coordination and communication mechanisms emerge and become embedded in some shared 
identity (Kogut-Zander, 1996). The consequence is that this common identity lowers the cost 
of communication for future search and learning. “As an activity becomes more specific to the 
firm, it increasingly accesses and develops a common organizational communication code 
which both codifies knowledge and facilitates its efficient dissemination and protection” 
(Poppo-Zenger 1998, page 857). Firms are therefore viewed as a governance structure that 
possesses advantages in generating firm-specific language and routines that yield valuable 
capabilities. When Knowledge is tacit and difficult to transfer, using independent contractor 
relationships for developing new knowledge may become very costly in terms of transactions 
and even impossible independently of any opportunistic behavior. “The key is that some of 
each person’s knowledge necessarily remains private, as established by the bounded-
rationality corollary. Honest persons (…) may disagree about the best course of joint (or even 
individual) action, or the division of gains. (…) The person’s “discovery” may produce 
lengthy and costly negotiation, which includes efforts to convey to the others both the 
originator’s analysis and the knowledge on which it is based. Because of irreducible 
individuals, adoption of the innovation may not be automatic.” (Conner-Prahalad, 1996, page 
483). Whereas under the cover of the hierarchy, communication can be easier and 
disagreement can easily be settled through authority. TCT confines the role of organizations 
to one of restricting the scope for opportunism compared to the market. This is not the view 
defended by the competence perspective (Moran-Goshal, 1996).  
In sum, hierarchy, through the formation of routines may enhance efficiency compared to 
the market. And this is especially true as soon as you consider activities that are specific to the 
firm. Therefore, activities that need human specific investments are supposed to be 
                                                
9 It should be noted that this is not the view that has been taken by TCT. Firms are supposed to try to economize 
on transaction costs. Those that do not succeed (and many do not succeed) are supposed to be pushed out of the 
business by competition pressure. That is why, in our view, TCT is more a normative than a positive theory of 
the firm. 
10 This view is surprisingly very close to the one developed in Coase 1937, where it is argued that a firm will 
integrate activities for which it has already developed knowledge necessary to its production. 
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internalized due to the enhanced governance efficiency when specific asset are needed, 
especially because firms have advantages and more capabilities than the market to develop 
these specific human assets. In other words, transaction costs inside the firm are not 
increasing with human asset specificity, but decreasing with it. Hypothesis 1 is then not 
retained by the competence perspective (CP). Hypotheses 2 remains common to both 
approaches. 
Hypothesis 1bis. The increase of human asset specificity creates value by decreasing 
production and transaction costs inside the firm.  
Main Proposition concerning the integration decision (CP): transactions with high level of 
human asset specificity are more probably internalized because (i) the firm handles better 
such transactions that lower the cost of the firm and (ii) the firm naturally searches to develop 
specific human assets. 
More formally, it means that asset specificity, and more particularly human asset 
specificity should lead to more integration because βtc-α tc<0, with βtc<0, α tc>0. That is to 
say transaction costs driven by specific human assets reduce transaction cost inside the firm 
and increase transaction costs on the market11. To illustrate this issue, we propose a quadratic 
form for transaction costs on the market and in the firm (See figure 2). Over a certain 
percentage of human asset specificity, the firm is the more adequate governance structure. We 
can note that this percentage threshold should be lower in the CP. 
 
Figure 2. Firms emergence with human asset specificity reducing internal organization costs 
 
With TCM = x2; TCF = 2000 – x2/10; x: % of human asset specificity 
TCM: transaction costs on the market ; TCF: transaction costs inside the firm 
 
                                                
11 Twin benefits of high asset specificity and low transaction costs might also be accomplished through the 
market (Dyer 1997). 
7 
Theories of the firm: How to rule out competing views? 
Économie et Institutions, n° 3, 2e semestre 2003 
 
1.3. Discussion 
Many questions and oppositions exist between alternative theories of the firm. This is also 
true concerning the transaction cost perspective and the competence perspective. The critics 
addressed by each theory to the rival perspective stresses many limits that have to be 
considered. 
For example, according to many transaction cost economists, the question of why firms 
would do better than the market in terms of developing knowledge is not completely 
addressed by the CP. As noted by Foss 1996, separately owned activities may conceptually be 
much more “embedded” than divisions of the same firms (e.g. communication channels, 
shared culture, social knowledge). Why market should not be able to replicate what is 
supposed by CP to characterize firms over markets? That is especially a problem in a 
framework without any opportunistic behavior that is the framework retained by CP! The 
argument from TCT would be that because hierarchy can more successfully control 
opportunism, higher order organizing principles would emerge. Consequently it seems to us 
that the CP does not address convincingly the question of the limit to the firm size, that is a 
unavoidable question for a theory of the firm.  
This contrast with the TCT framework, where differences between firms and market are 
more convincingly explained. Markets and hierarchies are supposed to have no identical 
access to fiat, firms enjoy the advantage over markets with respect to cooperative adaptation 
but not with respect to autonomous adaptation. Considerations of differential probity have 
been examined in the context of transactions where failures of loyalty and real time 
responsiveness could undermine integrity. The importance of cognitive specialization has also 
been featured. Nevertheless, it is only fair to say that cognitive specialization and the 
understanding of bureaucracy is underdeveloped in the TCT framework. 
This is emphasized by Dosi and Marengo (2000), who qualified TCT as a “primitive” story 
that deals with the efficiency of different governance structures in managing transactions 
across given technologically separable interfaces: technology and the division of labor, e.g. 
the solution to the productive problem at hand, are taken as already in place in their optimal 
form. Assumption that what is being coordinated (i.e. the pieces of “productive knowledge”) 
is independent from the organizational arrangement itself. Whereas the competence 
perspective sees organizations as being first of all responsible for designing and putting to 
work solutions to productive problems and that specific organizational arrangements are 
essential parts of such as design process, actually determining which solutions can be 
generated and tested. Consequently, what is mainly reproached to TCT is its static view of the 
firm. 
One possible view is to believe that there exists a complementarity between the two 
theories: “transaction cost economics informs the generic decision to make-or-buy while 
competence brings in particulars” (Williamson 1999:1097). Such a vision is reinforced by 
empirical tests in the CP framework that generally do not address the make or buy question to 
focus on differential of performances between firms. This position is defended by those 
named “integrationists” by Foss (2002). Nevertheless, as it is well noted by Foss (2002), CP 
and TCT’s position are hardly reconcilable (as they are shaped at the moment, they propose 
non compatible hypotheses12) and put other authors in the camp of “isolationists”.  
However, we do not believe that one theoretical framework is able to answer completely 
the underlying question of why firms exist and what are the firm’s boundaries. Following 
                                                
12 It remains that such incompatible hypotheses may be reconcilable as soon as you consider one might overstate 
the other depending of the considered environment in which the transaction evolves. As we will see later, the 
speed of technological change may permit to explain that in some cases, transaction cost mechanism to explain 
firm emergence is correct (Poppo-Zenger 1998 for defending such argument and section 2.2) 
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Holmström-Roberts (1998), we would say that a good theory of the firm is not only a story of 
investments incentives or transaction costs minimization broadly defined. We would expect 
the theory to incorporate such issues, but to take into account other issues such as resolving 
agency problems and knowledge transfers. The real question is to find how such a theory of 
the firm could incorporate all those elements together, putting good weight on each element. 
Such a theory should be constructed with the help of empirical research, in order for the 
theory to draw lessons from the empirical literature about the relative usefulness of 
transaction-cost and the competence perspective theories of the firm. The up-shot is that we 
believe the majority of empirical works to be irrelevant to rule out competing views of the 
firm. As we will argue below, traditional empirical specifications of make or buy models are 
unable to comparatively test among alternative theories. We urge for more sophisticated 
models of comparative institutional performance to rule out alternative views. 
2. What test to make theories compete each other? 
2.1. The weakness of “traditional” empirical tests 
On the one hand, transaction cost economics (TCE) is often viewed as an “empirical success 
story” (Williamson 1996). Recent surveys concerning empirical research using transaction 
cost analysis as theoretical framework exhibit more than 600 articles that empirically test 
some aspects of TCE theory (Boerner-Macher 2001). On the other hand, progresses are still to 
be made in order to conclude that TCE is a real empirical success story (Masten-Saussier 
2002, Saussier 2004). Especially when we consider econometrical tests looking at the 
question of the make-or-buy. Such tests, based on qualitative econometric models (probit/logit 
estimates) do not permit to identify each coefficient of our simple formal model of section 1. 
We would agree that despite the large body of empirical work that has been conducted to 
test TCT, most, if not all, of their findings are equivocal in their ability to confirm the 
underlying logical links on which the theory depends (Moran-Ghoshal 1996, page 67). The 
question is: Does hierarchy arise as a response to the increased hazards of market contracting? 
Or does internalization of those transactions lower their costs beyond what market governance 
can achieve, even without the threat of opportunism? Majority of TCE empirical tests do not 
permit to answer this question, that is, precisely the question that would permit to rule out 
competing views of RBV and TCE. 
As noted by Masten, “such tests do not permit identification of structural relations that 
underlies those hypotheses. The hypothesis that asset specificity favors integration, for 
example, is based on propositions (i) that investments in relationship-specific assets increase 
the scope for opportunism and (ii) that internal organization attenuates opportunism relative to 
market exchange… A finding that asset specificity increased the likelihood of integration 
could result even if asset specificity had no effect on the hazards of market exchange… if for 
some reason, investment in relationship-specific assets reduced internal organization costs” 
(Masten 1993). 
More formally, coming back to our simple model to illuminate how the decision to 
integrate might occur, and focusing again on transaction costs, the majority of empirical tests 
(probit/logit estimates) identify the sign of βtc-α tc13. But it is one thing to say that βtc-α tc<0 
because α tc>βtc>0 (that is to say transaction cost level is affected less positively in the firm 
compared to the market). Another thing is to say that βtc-α tc<0 because α tc>βtc with βtc<0 
and α tc>0 (that is to say transaction cost level is affected negatively in the firm, positively on 
                                                
13 Without entering in technical details, a probit model gives coefficients of the form (β −α)/σ , where σ 2 is 
the variance of (ea-ea). Predictions are based on the sign of (β −α). So, the less precise are manager’s 
perceptions, the smaller will be the estimated effect of a given characteristic of the studied transaction. The more 
inaccurate the selection process, and the less important organizational choices will appear in empirical tests 
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the market).14 As noted by Masten (2002), a finding that asset specificity increases the 
likelihood of integration could result even if asset specificity had no effect on the hazard of 
market exchange (α tc=0), or/and if for some reason, investment in relationship-specific assets 
reduced internal organization costs (βtc<0). In other words, the majority of econometrical tests 
of the make or buy decision might corroborate the transaction cost view of the firm as well as 
the resource based view of the firm. It is quiet embarrassing as empirical research, and more 
especially econometric works should be shaped in order to help us to determine probable 
explanations for the existence and boundaries of the firms. 
One conclusion can be derived from such an analysis: Earlier studies have demonstrated 
only a relationship between the level of quasi-rents and the difference in the costs of 
transacting via the marketplace versus the costs of transacting within the organization that let 
place for the RBV and TCT’s alternative views of the firm15. 
2.2. A need to assess the impact of organizational choices on performances 
To go a step further towards testing in order to disentangle alternative views of the firm, it 
would be useful to connect organizational choices and performances directly instead of 
limiting the analysis to the reduced-forms.  
Let’s represent a binary organizational strategy set (Gc, Ga) corresponding to the make or 
buy issue and the corresponding performance outcome (π c, π a). The crucial questions we 
have to answer in order to disentangle alternative views of the firm are: what would have been 
the performance, had the alternative strategy been chosen? And what is the effect of the 
organizational choice according to different values of exogenous variables (namely the 
characteristics of the transactions). These effects are the organizational effects we are 
interested in. To the first of these questions, TCT and CP views answer the same way; they 
only differ when it comes to the question of the effect of organizational choices regarding 
different values of human asset specificity. 
Let’s suppose we observe (Sc, π c) and (Sa, π a). We would like to estimate what their 
performanceπ i might have been choosing another strategy Si and what is the impact of a set 
of exogenous variables X. 



















Equations 3 and 4 may be estimated by OLS, using the sub-samples of firms choosing Sc 
and Sa only to the extent that all exogenous relevant variables are well known by the 
econometrician and that the set of internally (externally) sourced observations is a random 
sample of all observations. 
                                                
14 We do not consider here another question that is to assess how important is the question of governance choice. 
As we wrote elsewhere (Saussier 2002) it is not well established how important it is to choose correct 
governance structure in respect with performances. Very few empirical studies are conclusive on this very 
important question: “While it is tempting to infer from findings that governance forms varies with characteristics 
of transactions that governance is important for performance, whether or not economics models of organizational 
choice are good predictors of actual behavior actually reveals little about the implications of organizational form 
for firm performance. In fact the opposite is closer to the truth: Variety in organizational forms is most likely to 
be observed where organizational form matters least, so that small changes in the underlying environment can tip 
the net benefit calculation from one arrangement to another” (Masten 2002, page 430). 
15 For example, rather than assume the fear for quasi-rent expropriation in a couple of studies (Monteverde 1982 
a) 1982 b)) Monteverde is now arguing that “it may be the case that components produced internally by the auto 
companies are those whose efficient design and production requires dialog between engineers who, if they work 
within the same organization, have come to use the same firm-specific communication codes” (Monteverde 
1995, page 5).  
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Nevertheless, it is usual to suppose there exist unobservable variables that affect 
performance outcomes and that are also correlated with the organizational choice. And it is 
natural to believe a firm that chose organizational choice Sc may differ from a randomly 
selected firm in the population of firms. As it has been well explained by Hamilton and 
Nickerson (2003) the estimation approach depends on whether such unobservable variables 
exist and whether organizational choices are endogenous or not. If all variables that affect 
both performances and organizational choices are not known or organizational choices are not 
exogenous, then, using OLS procedure when estimating equations (4) and (5) could lead to a 
potential endogeneity problem.16 This obliges the researcher to use econometric methods (that 
are fairly routines now) to control for such endogenity, like the Heckman procedures (See 
Hamilton and Nickerson (2003) for more on this). Such procedure allows to account for the 
characteristics of the transaction on performance (on the market or in the firm) while 
simultaneously correcting for the sample bias in the estimates. 
The interesting thing is that there already exist a few empirical studies using performance 
measures and such techniques to disentangle CP and TCT’s views. We present the two of 
them we are aware of in the next section. 
2.3. Two contributions that do not settle the discussion 
The way to rule out those competing views of the firm is to estimate structural models instead 
of reduced-forms. As far as we know, only two papers proposed such an analysis and 
concluded definitively for one of the different views of the firm (mainly RBV vs TCT) 
proposed in section 1. Surprisingly, one of the two papers written by TCT’s authors (Masten-
Meehan-Snyder 1991) concluded for the RBV view of the firm. The other, written by RBV’s 
authors (Poppo-Zenger 1998) concluded for the TCT view of the firm. 
The organization of US naval shipbuilder (Masten-Meehan-Snyder 1991) 
Masten-Meehan-Snyder studied a sample of tasks and components from a large US naval 
shipbuilder. They collected through questionnaires data over 74 tasks and components and 
information concerning the cost of organization when such tasks and components were 
organized internally. Authors estimated the cost of organization by collecting data concerning 
the number of hours devoted by management to planning, directing, and supervising a 
particular component. As they have data concerning transaction costs in the firm, and data 
concerning sources of transaction costs (namely characteristics of the transaction operated in 
the firm or on the market), using Heckman method17, they infer transaction costs on the 
market and they found that “workers with more specific skills are less costly to manage” 
(page 18). Furthermore, they conclude that “the correlation between human capital specificity 
and the likelihood of integration … is a consequence of a decrease in internal organization 
costs rather than the increase in the costs of market exchange” (page 19). Such results might 
highlight the gains of organization over markets when human asset specificity is involved in 
transaction and give weight to the RBV view of the firm, even if the sample used for the study 
is quite small. 
                                                
16 E (π c ⏐Sc, X) = )()(
cciiicciii
SEXSXE εβεβ +=+ . If cov (Si , εci )≠0, as would be the case if there are 
unobserved factors that affect both the choice of strategy and performance, then 0)( ≠
cci
SE ε . 
17 They first estimated a standard transaction cost model of the make or buy choice. They then reemployed 
results to estimate transaction costs in connection with characteristics of transactions, taking account of selection 
biases using Mills ratios calculated from the first step. For more on this method, see Hamilton & Nickerson 
(2003). 
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The organization of information services (Poppo-Zender 1998) 
Poppo-Zenger (1998) studied the governance of nine information services at 152 companies, 
resulting in a sample 1 368 observations. Their test is thus more robust in terms of number of 
observations used compared to MMS’s study. Nevertheless, it is also less precise in the way 
asset specificity is measured (no differentiation between each kind of asset specificity) and 
they only use qualitative measure of performances, without any focus on transaction costs. 
They found that contrary to the RBV hypothesis (hypothesis 2) managers do not become more 
satisfied with performance as internal activities become more firm-specific (Poppo-Zenger 
1998, page 867). Furthermore, firm asset specificity has a strong negative effect on market 
performance and no clear effect on firm performance. Therefore TCT’s view is corroborated 
as their empirical test clearly shows that asset specificity triggers governance choices because 
hierarchies more effectively cope with asset specificity than market. They explain such 
deceived result (to their own view) by the fact that the underlying technological change is 
rapid (Poppo-Zenger (1998), page 872). Routines, language and embedded forms of 
knowledge are thus rigid mechanisms that hamper performance (that seem to be just the 
reverse affirmation of Dosi and Teece, 1998). 
Whatever the result of these two studies, we believe more empirical tests are to be made 
before to (definitively?) conclude. Nevertheless, we would like to point out that these two 
studies share something in common: In order to rule out competing views of the firm, they 
proposed refined tests compared to traditional empirical specifications of make or buy models 
that made TCT’s empirical success story and that are unable to comparatively test among 
alternative theories. Such models, based on comparative institutional performance to rule out 
alternative views, are just attempts to estimate more structural model than before. In other 
words, instead of testing the sign of (βtc-α tc) or (β -α ), by collecting information concerning 
transaction costs or firm performances, they tried to estimate β’s and α ’s. Such a way to 
proceed are real improvement as it permits to rule out competing views of the firm and 
furthermore to estimate how much important the governance choice in terms of performances 
is (Masten 2002). 
2.4. A need for case studies shaped in order to rule out competing views of 
the firm 
In parallel with more sophisticated econometric tests more detailed case studies should be 
conducted in order to assess more deeply intra firm coordination processes and costs. Such 
studies would permit to give insights concerning what is a firm and how it handles 
transactions necessitating high levels of specific assets, especially human assets. In our view, 
transaction cost economics focuses too much on factors aggravating market exchange with the 
underlying assumption that "substantially the same factors that are ultimately responsible for 
market failures also explain failures of internal organization" (Williamson 1973, page 316; 
Williamson 1996). Such assumption, if only correct, should be based on case studies 
providing us with more development concerning the hierarchy’s failures. In other words, 
studies concerning intra-firm coordination might be of interest to understand the frontiers of 
the firms. 
Conclusion 
This paper points out the fact that (i) several theoretical frameworks exist in order to explain 
the existence of firms, that (ii) are more substitute than complementary. In this paper, we do 
not discuss the coherence of those theoretical frameworks. We take as given the fact that they 
are sufficiently coherent to be of interest in order to understand why firms exist. We rather 
focus on empirical works that may help to choose between them. If many empirical studies 
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exist, we argue that (iii) very few are shaped in order to rule out competing views developed 
by the transaction cost theory and the resource based view of the firm. These conclusions 
raise the question of scientific methodology in empirical testing. For transaction cost 
economics to remain an empirical success story (with the assumption it is already a theoretical 
success story) and for resource based-view to be recognized as empirically relevant, it is time 
to shape empirical works in order to test one theory against the other one instead of simply 
corroborate propositions derived from only one theoretical framework. Without such effort, 
we can expect the coexistence of many theories giving different explanations of what is a firm 
and why they emerge. The question Coase raised long time ago is still at the top of our agenda 
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What is a firm? What explains the trade-off between make-or buy decisions? Based on a 
discussion confronting the Transaction Cost Theory and the Resource-based view, we 
show that despite many empirical studies, very few are shaped in order to rule out 
competing views of the firm. The paper raises the question of the methodology of 
empirical testing: theories should be tested one against the other instead of simply 
corroborating the propositions specific to each theoretical framework.  
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Résumé : 
Comment expliquer l’existence de la firme, l’arbitrage entre faire et faire-faire ? À partir 
d’une comparaison des propositions de la théorie des coûts de transaction et de 
l’approche en terme de ressources, nous montrons que les travaux empiriques ne 
permettent pas de les départager. À partir d’une discussion sur la méthodologie 
empirique, nous avançons que les théories devraient être testées les unes par rapport aux 
autres au lieu de réaliser des tests qui corroborent les propositions qui leur sont 
spécifiques. 
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